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During voir dire in Johnson v. McCullough, a medical 
malpractice case in Missouri, at least one juror failed to 
answer honestly a question about whether he had been a 
defendant or plaintiff in a lawsuit. After the verdict was 
entered, the plaintiff conducted a search on Missouri’s 
online case database and discovered that one of the jurors 
had been a defendant in a personal injury suit. In the 
resulting appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that 
litigants should conduct a search in this database during 
voir dire, instead of waiting until after a verdict is entered. 
Johnson is one of several cases that explicitly state an 
expectation that attorneys conduct a form of Internet 
research. New and existing ethics guidelines, including 
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5, place 
boundaries around the depth of inquiry permitted. 
According to some commentators, because Internet 
research is ethically permitted, at a minimum attorneys 
should ask leave of the court and conduct a precursory 
Internet search of the venire. This Article addresses the 
extent to which courts have permitted lawyers to use the 
Internet to conduct jury research and what limits the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct and courts place on the 
practice. It further addresses the degree to which this kind  
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of research has become compulsory as a shield against a 
possible malpractice claim. 
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Most potential jurors are like icebergs; you only see a small 
part of them during voir dire. An ever-increasing number of 
attorneys are turning to the Internet to uncover information about 
members of the venire that was previously beneath the waterline. 
In so doing, they are stepping into an unsettled field that lacks 
concrete guidance as to the level of scrutiny permitted or the level 
required to avoid exposure to a malpractice suit.1 
                                                                                                             
1 “Anyone who does not make use of [Internet searches] is bordering on 
malpractice.” Carol J. Williams, Jury Duty? May Want to Edit Online Profile, 
LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2008/sep/ 
29/nation/na-jury29. Multiple decisions have imposed some sort of obligation on 
attorneys to conduct Internet research on jurors or members of the venire in 
order to preserve a possible claim of juror misconduct or non-disclosure on 
appeal. See, e.g., Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 559 (Mo. 2010) (en 
banc) (requiring attorneys to conduct a search on Case.net, “Missouri's 
automated case record service,” before the trial begins in order to preserve the 
issue of a potential juror’s non-disclosure for appeal); Burden v. CSX Transp., 
Inc., No. 08–cv–04–DRH, 2011 WL 3793664, at 9 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2011) 
(holding that Internet searches constitute “reasonable diligence”). Even if 
Internet research of potential jurors does not offer the sole and unambiguous 
standard at present, barring a truly radical change by state or local bar 
associations, the place of the Internet in conducting voir dire will only expand as 
time progresses. 
2
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According to the vast majority of sources that have addressed 
this issue to date, an attorney’s use of the Internet to conduct 
research on a member of the venire is permissible unless an 
attorney attempts to reach out to a potential juror by, for example, 
following him or her on Twitter or sending a friend request on 
Facebook.2 In essence, a meaningful and important distinction 
between observing potential jurors’ Internet presences3—which is 
permitted—and using the Internet to interact with them—which is 
not—has begun to evolve. Because of its ease and immense 
usefulness in uncovering juror nondisclosure and bias, the failure 
to utilize Internet searches in voir dire research may fall below new 
expectations of attorney performance.4 That said, some judges may 
feel protective of the juries in their courtrooms and may disapprove 
of attorneys using the Internet to conduct research on potential 
jurors. An attorney should therefore request leave of the court 
before researching potential jurors on the Internet.5 
The growing efficacy of the Internet as a tool for conducting 
jury research has far outpaced the development of guidelines for its 
use, leaving Internet-based jury research in an ambiguous position. 
Interviews of practitioners have shown that “Internet vetting of 
jurors is catching on in courtrooms across the nation, [but] lawyers 
are skittish about discussing the activity, in part because court rules 
on the subject are murky or nonexistent in most jurisdictions.”6 
                                                                                                             
2 See, e.g., New York County Lawyers’ Ass'n Ethics Opinion No. 743 
(May 18, 2011); Phila. Bar Ass'n Ethics Opinion No. 2009-02 (Mar. 2009). 
3 “Internet presence” would include—but is certainly not limited to—an 
individual’s public profile on Facebook, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter or other 
social networking site; blogs the individual juror or actively participates in; 
comments on news articles and non-anonymous participation on Internet 
bulletin boards (e.g. Reddit, Digg, Fark or Slashdot). 
4 “With the relative present day ease of procuring the venire member's prior 
litigation experiences, via Case.net, ‘[w]e encourage counsel to make such 
challenges before submission of a case whenever practicable.’” Johnson, 306 
S.W.3d at 558 (quoting McBurney v. Cameron, 248 S.W.3d 36, 41 (2008)) 
(emphasis in original). 
5 Despite the permissibility of Internet research, see infra pp. 130-134, a 
request of leave is recommended for practical reasons because some judges may 
disapprove. At a minimum this prevents reprimand and preserves the issue for 
appeal. 
6 Brian Grow, Internet v. Courts: Googling for the Perfect Juror, REUTERS, 
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Courts and state bar associations are beginning to address this 
practice but they are doing so at a slower rate than attorneys are 
adopting it. Attorneys are taking up Internet research despite the 
fact that “‘[l]awyers don't know the rules yet . . . . It's like the Wild 
West.’”7 The few rules that have been issued permit the practice, 
though typically with limits. Because of the precedent set by these 
standards and the immense value of Internet research, the practice 
seems to be here to stay despite its uncertain position in most 
jurisdictions. 
 
I.  LIMITS ON UTILIZING THE INTERNET TO CONDUCT VOIR DIRE 
 
Under well-established rules, a lawyer’s actions relative to 
jurors fall along a spectrum spanning from the prohibited (ex parte 
communication with jurors) to the permitted and non-discoverable 
(independent jury research conducted by the attorney or jury 
consultants). Practitioners, courts, and state bar associations are 
struggling to fit Internet-based research and Internet-based 
interactions between lawyers, judges, and jurors into this spectrum. 
On one end of the spectrum, ex parte communication between 
lawyers and jurors is strictly prohibited under the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (MRPC). For example, “[t]he Model Rules 
[of Professional Conduct] and the Model Code forbid improper ex 
parte communications with jurors or prospective jurors.”8 In brief, 
before or during trial an attorney may not communicate in any way 
with any member of the venire or any juror away from the court’s 
watchful eye. The rule reads: “[a] lawyer shall not: (a) seek to 
influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by 
means prohibited by law; [or] (b) communicate ex parte with such 
a person during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law 
                                                                                                             
Feb. 17, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/17/us-courts-voirdire-
idUSTRE71G4VW20110217. 
7 Id. (quoting John Nadolenco, a partner at Mayer Brown in Los Angeles). 
8 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE 
LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2012–2013 ed. 2012) 
§ 3.5–3. These Rules have not been adopted wholesale by any state but many 
states have adopted rules of professional conduct similar to the MRPC. 
4
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or court order . . . .”9 The purpose of MRPC 3.5 is to prevent 
parties—or their attorneys—from passing information to jurors 
outside of court. “When all parties are not present to hear a 
communication with the court, the litigants cannot voice their 
positions or preserve their rights on appeal.”10 
Questions remain about whether attorneys have a duty to 
disclose the results of Internet research on jurors to opposing 
counsel. Generally, what must be disclosed is governed by 
procedural rules. The Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal 
Procedure offer safe harbor for materials produced in preparation 
for trial, such as work product produced by jury or trial 
consultants.11 The results of research on jurors or members of the 
venire, conducted either with or without the aid of the Internet, 
could arguably fall under the protections of these rules. Hence, 
under this logic, Internet jury research is not discoverable and there 
exists no duty to disclose the results of the research.12 
Formal ethics opinions issued by the bar associations of New 
York County and Philadelphia follow the reasoning that activity 
conveying any information—no matter how minimal—from a 
lawyer to a potential juror is not permissible. Information, for these 
purposes, includes the fact that a lawyer is following a juror on 
Twitter, wants to be friends on Facebook or joins the juror’s 
network on LinkedIn. When asked whether an attorney could 
conduct ongoing research on members of an empanelled jury by 
monitoring their footprint on social networking sites, the New 
                                                                                                             
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5. 
10 ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 8, § 3.5–3. 
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (“[o]rdinarily, a party may not discover 
documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or 
for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party’s 
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)”) and FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 16(a)(2) (“this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, 
memoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for 
the government or other government agent in connection with investigating or 
prosecuting the case”) and (b)(2)(A) (“[e]xcept for scientific or medical reports, 
Rule 16(b)(1) does not authorize discovery or inspection of: reports, 
memoranda, or other documents made by the defendant, or the defendant's 
attorney or agent, during the case's investigation or defense”). 
12 Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Applying Rules of Discovery to Information 
Uncovered About Jurors, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 28 (2011). 
5
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York State Bar Association responded: 
It is proper and ethical under [Rule of Professional 
Conduct] 3.5 for a lawyer to undertake a pretrial 
search of a prospective juror’s social networking 
site, provided that there is no contact or 
communication with the prospective juror and the 
lawyer does not seek to ‘friend’ jurors, subscribe to 
their Twitter accounts, send jurors tweets or 
otherwise contact them.13 
In 2009, the Philadelphia Bar Association’s Professional 
Guidance Committee addressed a proposal that went beyond 
passively monitoring individuals. An attorney in Philadelphia 
wanted to have a third party “friend” an unrepresented witness on 
Facebook.14 This would, on its face, seem to avoid the above 
problem of having direct contact with that person; however, such 
behavior seems to violate the intention of the MRPC. The 
Committee opined that this roundabout process would constitute 
making a false statement and therefore misconduct under MRPC 
8.4(a).15 Rule 8.4 reads “[i]t is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another . . . [or] (c) engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty . . . or misrepresentation . . . .”16 The Philadelphia Bar 
Association reasoned that MRPC 5.3(a) prohibits an attorney from 
using a third party as an intermediary because third parties are held 
to the same standard as attorneys. An attorney’s obligations to an 
unrepresented third party under the MRPC are more relaxed than 
those owed to a juror under MRPC 3.5. The Philadelphia Bar 
Association’s opinion ultimately boils down to the fact that 
reaching out to a juror—by “friending” the juror on Facebook or 
                                                                                                             
13 New York County Lawyers’ Ass'n Ethics Opinion No. 743 (May 18, 
2011). 
14 Pennsylvania has adopted MRPC 3.5, 5.3 and 8.4. 
15 Phila. Bar Ass'n Ethics Opinion No. 2009-02 (Mar. 2009). 
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4. This principle, that an 
attorney cannot get an agent to do something the attorney cannot do him or 
herself, has been long settled in legal ethics. 
6
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following the juror on Twitter—violates the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
The reasoning of the New York and Philadelphia decisions is 
consistent with the decisions of numerous courts that have defined 
“communicate” to include activities such as joining someone’s 
network on LinkedIn or friending an individual on Facebook or 
Myspace.17 This reading of “communicate” is likely broader than 
the drafters of the MRPC contemplated, as the relevant sections of 
the MRPC were last updated in 2002, before the proliferation of 
social networking websites. However, this interpretation of 
“communicate” reflects the concern that permitting juror contact in 
this way would open the door for illicit communication and 
highlights the party’s interest to the individual contacted.  
Some attorneys consider it ethically acceptable to have a 
potential juror friend the attorney’s office. Armando Villalobos, 
the district attorney of Cameron County, Texas, “is considering a 
method to get behind the site's private wall to learn more. One 
option is to grant members of the jury pool free access to the 
court's wi-fi network in exchange for temporarily “friending his 
office.”18 He has purchased iPads to allow his prosecutors “to scan 
the Web during jury selection.”19 Villalobos’s project demonstrates 
the shift towards greater use of the Internet to conduct research on 
potential jurors. 
 
                                                                                                             
17 People v. Fernino, 19 Misc.3d 290, 293, 851 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. 2008) (“The MySpace Friend Requests fall within the court's mandate that, 
‘Respondent shall have NO CONTACT' (sic) with [a woman who had a 
restraining order against the respondent].’”). But see People v. Rios, 26 Misc.3d 
1225(A), 907 N.Y.S.2d 440, 2010 WL 625221, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (finding 
no juror misconduct when a juror “friended” a witness because “[d]efendants 
failed to elicit any testimony to establish. . . [how the juror’s] ‘feelings’ implicit 
in her friend request affected the jury's deliberations in any way.”) 
18 Ana Campoy Ashby Jones, Searching for Details Online, Lawyers 
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II.  PERMISSIBILITY OF SEARCHING THE INTERNET  
FOR INFORMATION ABOUT JURORS 
 
Attorneys understandably feel the need to conduct as much 
research about their panel as possible, because the Constitution 
guarantees the right to “an impartial jury” during criminal trials.20 
Similarly, the Seventh Amendment’s right to a trial by jury in civil 
cases implies the right to an impartial jury.21 The Supreme Court 
has read this provision to require “identifying and eliminating 
biased and prejudicial prospective jurors.”22 To that end, attorneys 
conduct voir dire to screen potential jurors for possible biases that 
would preclude their objectivity. The Supreme Court has “stressed 
the wide discretion granted to trial courts in conducting voir dire in 
the area of pretrial publicity and in other areas that might tend to 
show juror bias.”23 
Attorneys are permitted to make 
a suitable inquiry . . . in order to ascertain whether 
the juror has any bias, opinion, or prejudice that 
would affect or control the fair determination by 
him of the issues to be tried. That inquiry is 
conducted under the supervision of the court, and a 
great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound 
discretion. This is the rule in civil cases, and the 
same rule must be applied in criminal cases.24 
The typical guidelines during voir dire are that attorneys are not 
permitted to begin arguing their case or pose hypotheticals too 
close to the facts of the controversy at issue.25 Beyond that, 
                                                                                                             
20 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 and amend. VI. 
21 See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 549–54 
(1983) (Alleged failure of a juror to answer truthfully during voir dire does not 
entitle a party to a new trial “unless the juror's failure to disclose denied 
respondents their right to an impartial jury”). 
22 Karen Monsen, Privacy for Prospective Jurors at What Price? 
Distinguishing Privacy Rights from Privacy Interests; Rethinking Procedures to 
Protect Privacy in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 REV. LITIG. 285 (2002). 
23 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 415 (1991).  
24 Id. at 422 (quoting Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895)). 
25 Marc B. Stahl, Objections During Voir Dire Examination of Prospective 
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permissible questions are subject to the trial judge’s discretion and 
can vary widely from courtroom to courtroom. 
 
A.  Permissibility of In-Court Use of the Internet 
 
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court was 
among the first appellate courts in the country to explicitly address 
whether attorneys could use the Internet to conduct research during 
voir dire.26 The court made wireless Internet access available in the 
courthouse in April 2008.27 The following May, plaintiff’s counsel 
in a medical malpractice case used a laptop to obtain Internet-
based information about potential jurors.28 The judge ordered the 
attorney to close his laptop because he failed to inform defense 
counsel of his intention to use the court’s Internet in the courtroom 
during voir dire.29 The plaintiff appealed, alleging that the trial 
court erred in—amongst other things—“precluding his attorney 
from accessing the Internet during jury selection.”30 
The appellate court explained that unequal use of the Internet 
did not imply an unequal playing field: “[t]hat [plaintiff’s counsel] 
had the foresight to bring his laptop computer to court, and defense 
counsel did not, simply cannot serve as a basis for judicial 
intervention in the name of ‘fairness’ or maintaining ‘a level 
playing field.’”31 The court continued, “[t]he ‘playing field’ was, 
in fact, already ‘level’ because Internet access was open to both 
counsel, even if only one of them chose to utilize it.”32 Despite that 
fact, the Appellate Division did not overturn the trial court because 
the plaintiff could not point to a single juror whom he would have 
dismissed based on the Internet research he subsequently 
performed outside the courthouse. Ultimately, Carino held that not 
                                                                                                             
Jurors, 97 ILL. B.J. 42 (2009). 
26 Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071, at 4 and 10 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010); Duncan Stark, Profiling Jurors: How Far 
is too Far?, 7 WASH J.L. TECH. & ARTS 93, 103 (2011). 
27 Carino, 2010 WL 3448071 at 10. 
28 Id. at 4. 
29 Id. at 4 and 10. 
30 Id. at 7. 
31 Id. at 10. 
32 Id. 
9
Lundberg: Googling Jurors to Conduct Voir Dire
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012
132 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 8:2 
only could attorneys use the Internet, they could do so in the 
courtroom. The Carino court did not, however, delve into the 
possible types of Internet research, or attempt to make such 
research compulsory, but a Missouri case decided a few months 
earlier took that next step. 
 
B.  Limited Duty to Conduct Internet Searches 
 
In Johnson v. McCullough, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
created a limited duty for lawyers to research members of the 
venire. During voir dire in a medical malpractice case, plaintiff’s 
counsel asked the venire if any of them had any “prior involvement 
in litigation.”33 Many members of the venire answered 
affirmatively but one member did not respond and eventually 
became part of the seated jury.34 The jury returned a verdict for the 
defendant; the juror in question voted in favor of that verdict.35 
After the jury returned the verdict, plaintiff’s counsel searched 
Case.net36 and found that this specific juror “had been a defendant 
in multiple debt collection cases and in a personal injury case.”37 
Three of these cases had been filed in the previous two years.38 
The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial alleging jury non-
disclosure based on this juror’s failure to reveal her prior litigation 
history.39 After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion.40 The 
Supreme Court of Missouri found no error in the granted motion 
because the reviewing court “cannot convict the trial court of error 
                                                                                                             
33 Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 554 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). The 
exact question was, “Now not including family law, has anyone ever been a 
plaintiff or a defendant in a lawsuit before?” 
34 Id. at 554–55. 
35 Id. at 555. 
36 “Case.net can be accessed using the following web address: 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet.” Id., at 554 n. 2. “Case.net is your access to 
the Missouri state courts automated case management system. From here you 
are able to inquire about case records including docket entries, parties, 
judgments and charges in public court.” Case.net, YOUR MISSOURI COURTS 
(Oct. 23, 2011, 10:35 AM) https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet. 
37 Johnson, 306 S.W.3d at 554. 
38 Id. at 555. 
39 Id. at 554. 
40 Id. 
10
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in following the law in existence at the time of trial,” namely, that 
there was no duty to search Case.net or any other database to 
verify jurors’ answers before trial began.41 
The court continued noted in dicta that “[w]ith the relative 
present day ease of procuring the venire member's prior litigation 
experiences, via Case.net, ‘[w]e encourage counsel to make such 
challenges before submission of a case whenever practicable.’”42 
The court further stated that, “to preserve the issue of a juror's non-
disclosure, a party must use reasonable efforts to examine the 
litigation history on Case.net of those jurors selected but not 
empanelled and present to the trial court any relevant information 
prior to trial.”43 This approach discourages attorneys from waiting 
to perform a search until after an unfavorable verdict has been 
entered. In requiring a search to preserve the issue of non-
disclosure, Johnson took a step towards establishing the need for 
Internet research during voir dire as a standard of professional 
care. 
 
C.  What Exactly Do Courts Permit? 
 
Over the last few years, numerous bar journals have published 
articles describing the benefits of using the Internet during voir 
dire.44 Support for this practice stems from the fact that potential 
jurors have an ever-expanding footprint on the Internet by way of 
public records, participation in social networking sites, 
                                                                                                             
41 Id. at 558. 
42 Id. at 558–59 (quoting McBurney v. Cameron, 248 S.W.3d 36, 41 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis in original). 
43 Johnson, 306 S.W.3d at 558–59. 
44 See Jamila A. Johnson, Voir Dire: To Google or Not to Google, 5 
GP/SOLO LAW TRENDS AND NEWS (2008), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/liti
gation_johnson.html; Michelle D. Craig, Did you Twitter My Facebook Wall?, 
58 La. B.J. 26. (2010); Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E-
Discovery Frontier, 66-NOV BENCH & B. MINN. 22 (2009); Suzanna Craig 
Robertson, ‘Friend’ or Foe: Social Media is Calling. How Should Lawyers 
Answer?, 47-MAR TENN. B.J. 16 (2011); Greg Stoner, The Jury Is Out: 
Considerations for Using an Online Jury Research Service, 59-FEB VA. 
LAWYER 48 (2011). 
11
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membership in various organizations with an Internet presence, 
and postings on blogs and services such as Twitter.45 
Much of this data is available via lower-tech jury research. One 
commentator has opined that permissible activities include general 
searches for the potential juror’s name (i.e., googling the potential 
juror), searching government databases to determine if the juror 
contributed to political candidates or Political Action Committees, 
and searching on social networking sites (e.g., Facebook, Myspace, 
Twitter and LinkedIn).46 Aside from Johnson, which limited its 
comments to searches on Case.net, no court has addressed what 
online information may or may not be permissible to consult in 
conducting jury research. 
One way to narrow the scope of Internet research is by 
questioning members of the venire on their Internet use. One could 
ask, for example, what Web sites or social networking sites a 
potential juror frequents, or if the potential juror writes for a blog. 
Further, one could ask what usernames a potential juror uses on 
various Web sites, especially social networking sites.47 On the 
other hand, there are some problems inherent in that line of 
questioning, including the potential for illicit contact and the 
possibility that jurors find this degree of questioning invasive. 
Therefore, before asking members of the venire for a list of the 
usernames they use on various social networking sites, attorneys 





The Internet has given attorneys an additional resource to 
conduct research on potential jurors during voir dire. For now, the 
MRPC offer a guide, despite being written for a somewhat 
different time, and remain one of the only sources on point until 
courts or state bar associations develop a firm set of guidelines 
                                                                                                             
45 JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION 235 
(3rd ed. 2011). 
46 Id. at 251–52. 
47 It is becoming increasingly common to ask for this sort of information 
from parties to a suit in interrogatories or requests for production. 
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governing when and how attorneys can vet members of the venire 
using the Internet. Even if following those rules in good faith, 
attorneys should seek leave of the court before beginning that 
research, because judges may oppose Internet research on 




 Request leave and permission of the court before 
undertaking Internet research on potential jurors. 
 Do not contact the venire in any way, including friending 
potential jurors on Facebook or MySpace, connecting on 
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